Abstract: This paper investigates the change in wages associated with a spell of unemployment. The novelty lies in using monthly data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) to analyze the dynamics of those wage changes across different business cycles. The level of education or the sector of re-employment affects the change in wages following an unemployment spell differently across different downturns. The degree of wage rigidity varies across recessions; wage changes preand post-unemployment are sometimes procyclical and sometimes countercyclical. These results may be useful for understanding the different aggregate employment dynamics observed across downturns and recoveries.
Introduction
When it comes to employment dynamics, not all recessions look alike. Some display large drops in employment followed by swift recoveries, yet after other recessions labor markets remain weak with low growth in job creation long after output begins to increase. The behavior of labor productivity also changes across recessions. It is procyclical during some periods and countercyclical during other periods.
In light of this heterogeneity in aggregate labor market dynamics, it seems sensible to investigate more disaggregated patterns and compare these across recessions. The literature has focused on quantities (worker and job flows) but our knowledge of how individual wages evolve across recessions is limited. To remediate this deficiency, this paper investigates whether the dynamics and determinants of wage changes associated with a spell of unemployment vary across business cycles. Are unemployment spells more damaging to highly-educated individuals during specific downturns? Do wages earned upon re-employment react more to aggregate labor market conditions in particular recessions? These are examples of the questions this paper answers. To be more specific we examine individual-level wages along three dimensions. First, we analyze, by recession, the distribution of individual wage changes pre-and postunemployment for spells of different length. Second, we examine, also by recession, how those wage changes relate to workers' characteristics. Finally, we compare the degree of nominal wage rigidity across recessions. By rigidity we refer to the reaction of the change in wages pre-and post-unemployment to changes in aggregate labor market conditions. Restricting our attention to wage changes after an unemployment spell is predicated on previous research. Studies using wage data at the annual frequency have found that wages of workers who do not switch jobs vary little over time. 1 All of our analysis is based on the Survey of Income and Program Participation 1 See Pissarides (2010) for a summary of results regarding cyclical dynamics of wages and more evidence that wages of "switchers" are more cyclical than those of job "stayers". The term "switchers" in previous literature refers to workers who switch employers without necessarily suffering a spell of unemployment. Here we refer to workers who, in addition to changing jobs, also experience an intervening spell of unemployment.
(SIPP)
. This survey provides labor-market-related information at the monthly frequency for a large panel of individuals. Available data allow us to compare the last three recessions: 1991, 2001, and 2008. It is both the high-frequency and the panel length -about three years for each survey -that make our analysis feasible. Since unemployment is a short-lived phenomenon for most individuals, information at the monthly frequency is essential for comparing wages before and after unemployment. Our analysis concerns only a particular group of workers: those who are paid by the hour. The focus on these workers is most appropriate because they provide a clean measure of the price of labor. Measurement errors in hours that plague total earnings responses frequently contaminate wages computed for salaried workers.
We find the distributions of wage changes after long and short unemployment spells to be similar. Of the three recessions we study, only during the Great Recession were the average growth rate in wages higher for the short-term unemployed than the long-term unemployed. During the 1991 and 2001 recessions the growth in wages after an unemployment spell was higher for the long-term unemployed. 2 We find that about 50% of all unemployed (both short-and long-term) individuals experience an increase in wage. The picture of the long-term unemployed as expecting large drops in wages is only half-true: typically a large mass of them enjoy fairly large wage changes.
The so-called Great Recession was an exception: the distribution of wage changes features clearly a decrease in the mass of long-term unemployed that experience large and positive wage growth, relative to 1991 and 2008. However, a stylized fact across all recessions we study is that the distribution of wage changes for the long-term unemployed displays positive skewness while skewness is negative for the short-term unemployed. Finally, it is worth noting that the degree of dispersion in wage changes 2 In this paper, long-term spells are those that last more than four months. The reason for setting that cut-off point for a long-term spell is a result of the design in the SIPP. As interviews occur every four months, and there is a tendency in some respondents to provide the same answer in each for the months in between interviews, lengths of unemployment spells cluster at every four months. During the 1991 recessions the number of workers unemployed for more than 8 months is small. Hence, we settle for 4 months as the cut-off length for defining long-term. 2 is always larger for the long-term unemployed.
The association between wage changes and certain workers' characteristics changes from recession to recession. Education provides one of the most interesting examples.
The relationship between education and wage changes is U-shaped during the 1991 recession. In other words, workers with high and low education levels experience lower wage drops as a result of being unemployed, relative to workers with medium education levels. This pattern disappears during the 2001 recession, which saw larger wage drops for workers with a higher level of education. 3 Other variables affect wages in a comparable manner across downturns. The negative effect of age on wages after an unemployment spell has been roughly constant over the past three recessions.
The final question we investigate concerns the degree of nominal wage rigidity across downturns. In widely used models (e.g. Pissarides (1985) ), this hypothesis can generate large drops in employment followed by slow recoveries in the labor market.
Some authors, most notably Shimer (2010) , have put forth the hypothesis that wages have recently become more rigid, potentially explaining the prevalence of recoveries 3 These statements are conditional on other worker characteristics such as ethnicity or marital status.
3 with meager employment growth. 4 We empirically assess this potential explanation. we apply that methodology to high-frequency data instead of annual data. 5 A comparative analysis of recessions focusing on the behavior of wage changes preand post-unemployment is new to the literature. We begin by describing the distribution of wage changes following an unemployment spell, distinguishing between shortterm and long-term spells. Contrary to studies which focused on displaced workers (e.g. Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1991) or Portugal (1989)), we find that the difference between wage changes of short-and long-term unemployed is not large.
There are major differences between those studies and ours that could explain the discrepancies. First, the time periods are different 6 implying important changes in the composition of the labor force or even a different nature of the 1980s recessions relative to the more recent ones we study. Second, workers in our sample may return to their previous employer; displaced workers by definition are re-employed elsewhere.
As job-specific human capital is still useful if the employer remains the same, wage changes may not be substantial. Finally, our definition of long-term unemployment 4 Wage rigidity as a mechanism to generate volatile unemployment rates has been explored extensively, for instance in Shimer (2004) . 5 We focus on nominal wages instead of real wages which are actually the appropriate measure in the theoretical work. Nevertheless, inflation measures have been rather stable during the short-time periods considered and relative to past history (e.g. the 1970s). 6 Portugal (1989) studies the Displaced Workers Special survey (DWS) from the CPS conducted in 1984. Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1991), study quarterly earnings from 1974 to 1986 for a group of workers in Pennsylvania.
is a spell that lasts for more than four months (16 weeks), which is a relatively short period of time.
The cyclical dynamics of wages have been the object of a large literature. 7 However, since previous studies have used annual data a comparison of wage rigidity across recessions has eluded economists. Employing the high-frequency data in SIPP allows us to examine the relationship between wage changes and the unemployment rate across recessions. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first paper with that goal.
A recent study by Barattieri, Basu, and Gottschalk (2010) is closest to what we attempt here. There are similarities such as the use of the SIPP (only the 1996-1999 panel), and the focus on nominal wage changes, but the similarities end there. Their interest lies in assessing the frequency of wage changes for workers who do not change jobs.
They show that the distribution of wage changes is right-skewed with little mass on the left side, arguing that there is a substantial amount of wage rigidity. We study the wage changes after unemployment spells and whether these wage changes are cyclical. 8 Moreover, we compare the cyclical dynamics across downturns and subsequent recoveries, arguably when movements in the unemployment (and other variables related to the business cycle) are largest. During downturns and the early phases of the recovery, the distribution of wage changes unemployed workers experience displays little skewness; and although the median is zero change, there is a substantial mass of workers who experience large wage drops, both short and long-term unemployed.
Wage Dynamics and Unemployment
7 A non-exhaustive list of examples in this literature includes Barlevy (2001) , Bils (1985) , Barsky, Solon, and Parker (1994), Deveraux (2001), and Shin (1994) . 8 In the Appendix we analyze the 1996-1996 and 2004-2007 surveys. We confirm that wages changes pre-and post-unemployment do not react much to aggregate labor market conditions, thus obtaining similar results to Barattieri et al. for our sample of unemployment spells.
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The SIPP
The SIPP is a longitudinal survey designed to be representative of the U.S. labor force.
It is constructed as a sequence of panels of households who are interviewed for about three years but the actual time-frame differs across panels. Designed and maintained by the U.S. Census, the first panel began in 1984 and the last panel started in 2008.
Households are interviewed every four months during the time they remain in the sample, providing information on work experience (employment, hours, earnings, occupation, and industry, among other variables) for the months in between interviews.
The SIPP also requests useful information for analyzing labor market outcomes such as gender, age, education, marital status, and ethnicity.
The introduction motivates a comparative analysis of business cycles based on the dynamics of individual wages. To perform this analysis we need to define first what we mean by a "business cycle". In the United States an official recession begins whenever the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) determines that a peak in economic activity has been reached, and it lasts until a similar announcement is made regarding the trough. In general a business cycle lasts until another peak is reached. Given the length of the typical survey in the SIPP -about three years -and to be consistent in our comparison of business cycles, the definition of a cycle we employ is somewhat different. The starting point of a business cycle is the official NBER-announced peak, For each of these recessionary episodes we restrict the analysis to hourly workers.
This group represents about 44.6% of all workers in 1991, 50.6% of all workers in 2001, and 49.1% of all workers in 2008. The reason to focus on this group is that they provide the cleanest measure of the price of labor: a wage rate for each hour they work.
The remainder of workers, those compensated with a monthly or annual salary, do not report such a measure and it needs to be inferred from their responses about total earnings and total hours worked. As hours reported in the SIPP are notoriously inaccurate, including much missing data, we discard salaried workers.
After eliminating some observations for various reasons 11 , we obtain a panel in which for each individual we record her employment status, the wage rate (if they are employed), the industry in which they work, and other characteristics (age, education, marital status, race, and whether they are residents of a metro area). The construction of a panel of this type is performed for each of the three SIPP surveys. In an Appendix we provide summary statistics of several variables for the workers in our three panels.
The Distribution of Wage Changes
We are interested in the dynamics of the wage change that presumably takes place in between two employment spells. That change in wages can be calculated in several ways. For example, one may calculate it using the logarithm of the ratio of the first wage earned after finding a job to the last wage earned in the last employment spell.
Alternatively, it can be computed as the logarithm of the ratio of the average wage rate enjoyed while employed for several periods after having been unemployed, to the average wage rate enjoyed during the last employment spell. Here we report the statistics using the first measure; the second measure gives similar moments and the results are relegated to an Appendix. Measuring the change in wages using the logarithm of the ratio of the first wage after re-employment relative to the last wage earned, yields a cross-sectional distribution of wage log-differences. Figures 1 and 2 plot those cross-sectional distributions for short-term spells (those with a duration of four months or less) and long-term spells (those longer than four months). Each figure includes graphs for each of the three panels. Tables C.1 and C.2 report some moments from those distributions. 12 The logdifference in wages before and after an unemployment spell is higher for individuals 12 The sample sizes for all the distributions are given in the rightmost columns of Tables C.1 and C.2. These numbers seem small compared to the number of observations reported in the summary statistics table (see the Appendix). Keep in mind that table reports the number of total observations (individuals times periods) and the numbers reported in Tables C.1 and C.2 are observations of unemployment spells only. 8 who experience long-term spells than for individuals whose spells are shorter in duration. The 2008 recession is the exception: the log-difference is -0.012 for the long-term unemployment but 0.002 for those unemployed four months or less. In the first two recessions, "patience" during the search process might tilt the growth rates upwards for the long-term unemployed (accepted wages rise in duration). It is possible that during the 2008 recessions human capital losses might lower the wage in the new job, lowering the mean growth rate. Positing and testing a theory is outside the scope of this paper but the aging of the workforce might be a factor behind the pattern: as workers age, the stock of firm-or occupation-specific human capital increases. These types of capital depreciate after a long unemployment spell becoming the dominant force in the change in wages.
The dispersion in the wage changes for the long-term unemployed is higher than for the short term unemployed. The possible exception is the 2008 recession in which the point estimate for the standard deviation is higher for the long-term, but the difference is small. About half of wage changes are negative; the median for all years and for both short-term and long-term unemployment is zero. 13, 14 The shapes of these distributions contrast with the conventional wisdom that nominal wages change little. Drops can be substantial for many individuals and it is not rare to record wage log-differences lower than -0.7. Extreme values appear to be more common after short-spells than long-spells.
Evidence is thus consistent with a large degree of heterogeneity among the longterm unemployed. Some of these workers are possibly individuals with a considerable buffer stock of savings that can be depleted during their job search. Yet others experience large human capital losses and eventually have to accept relatively low wage offers. In light of this heterogeneity, it is not surprising that the distribution of wage changes for the long-unemployed is relatively dispersed.
Finally, the distribution of wage changes after a short-term spell is negatively skewed.
For long-term spells, skewness is positive. The 2001 recession stands out relative to the the other two, as overall skewness decreases becoming more negative for short-term spells and closer to zero for long-term spells.
Individual Characteristics and Wage Changes
The unconditional distributions of wage changes shown in the previous section are only the first step in understanding wage dynamics across recessions. The distribution of workers across other characteristics (age, race, education, or marital status) has 13 That the median is exactly zero may reflect measurement error to some extent. The fraction of individuals who report exactly the same wage pre-and post-unemployment are 19.03% in 1991, 10.47% in 2001, and 12.39% in 2008. Some of these cases could represent individuals who are recalled for the same position at the same firm after a temporary layoff. However, since wage rates are usually rounded to the nearest 50 cents it is not surprising that for a significant fraction of individuals, when they perform roughly the same task across jobs, wage rates do not change.
14 A recent paper by Veramendi (2011) uses Danish data to compare wage rates the pre-and postunemployment. He finds that 50% of workers who experience an unemployment spell are re-employed at higher-wages. That is the fraction we find as well, both for long-term and short-term unemployed. On the other hand, studying the Spanish economy Rosolia and Saint-Paul (1998) find that, on average, wages post-unemployment are about 30% lower than before unemployment. changed over time. To measure the statistical relationship between observables and wage changes, we regress the (log) wage changes pre-and post-unemployment on some variables of interest. Specifically we fit,
The left-hand-side variable of equation (1) Education is another variable whose effects on wages change across business cycles.
In 1991, the effect of education on wage changes is U-shaped. In other words, after an In Table C .6 we inspect more closely the effects of switching industries on wages.
We divide industries in five groups: Agriculture, Manufacturing, Construction, Low-Skill Services, and High-Skill Services. 17 We assign workers in our sample to a group according to the industry reported at the time of the job loss. We re-define an industry switch as losing a job in one of the five industries and being re-employed in one of the other four. For each industry we fit equation (1) 
Nominal Wage Rigidity Across Recessions
The analysis in this section concerns the degree of wage rigidity across business cycles.
As summarized in the introduction, several theories link the lack of response of wages to aggregate conditions (the unemployment rate and inflation) to the sluggish recov- 17 The Low-Skill Services group includes Personal Services, Transportation, Retail Trade, Wholesale Trade, Private Households, Entertainment/Recreation and Social Services. The High-Skill group includes Communication, Utilities, Finance, Business Services, Hospitals, Medical and Education. 18 The coefficients for all other control variables in these industry-specific regressions are available upon request. 
The coefficients {φ t } T t=1 can be interpreted as the change in aggregate wages over time controlling for heterogeneity across workers. The second stage of the methodology involves regressing those coefficients on the changes in the aggregate unemployment rate: 19
In this equation ∆U t denotes the monthly change of unemployment rate and ν t is an error term. The coefficient β is our measure of the degree of cyclicality of nominal wages (or more precisely the cyclicality of nominal wage changes). Thus, comparing β across recessions yields a comparison of the degree of wage rigidity across recessions.
When β < 0 wages are procyclical; the closer β is to zero, the weaker the reaction of wages to aggregate conditions in the labor market. Following this strategy, we run the two-step regression for each of the three surveys described earlier. Since the short-term unemployed and long-term unemployed differ along several dimensions, we perform the same two-step analysis separately for short-term and long-term spells, as well as for all workers simultaneously. 
Robustness
We assess the robustness of the results shown to alternative definitions of right-hand or left-hand side variables in the second-step regression. These alternatives concern adjusting for seasonality, the relationship between accumulated past changes in the unemployment rate and wage changes, and the behavior of inflation.
Because there is no adjustment for seasonality in wages in equation (1), the estimated time coefficient φ captures some seasonal effects. To be consistent, in the benchmark estimation we use the non-seasonally adjusted unemployment rate to estimate equation (2) . An alternative is to seasonally-adjust wage changes in the first-stage regression by including quarterly dummy variables and use the seasonally-adjusted unemployment rate as the independent variable in the second-step regression. The results of this exercise are reported in Table C In the benchmark model, an increase in the unemployment rate affects wage changes immediately. In principle, past labor market condition could accumulate over time and have an impact current wages upon re-employment. To explore this hypothesis we modify equation (2) We finally ask whether the behavior of inflation is responsible for the apparent heterogeneity in nominal wage dynamics across business cycles. We measure inflation using the rate of change in the Consumer Price Index (CPI) which we add as a con- 
A Sample Selection and Data Summary
We perform five steps to clean-up the original sample and reach our final sample.
These five steps are:
• Step 1 : Drop individuals younger than 16 years old.
•
Step 2 : Keep only those individuals who are paid by the hour.
• Step 3 : Drop observations for individuals not in the labor force but who report wages.
• Step 4 : Drop observations for employed individuals who do not report wages.
Step 5 : Eliminate the top and bottom 1% of the earnings distribution. Step 1 281,063 618,285 656,432
Step 2 710,791 1,565,708 2,790,583
Step 3 479 15,726 19,990
Step 4 951 21,611 17,967
Step 5 6,738 27,292 32,080 Table A .2 reports some summary statistics for each of the three downturns and variables used to control for individual level characteristics in the first-step regression. 
B Additional Results
B.1 An Alternative Measure of the Change in Wages
This section provides an analysis analogous to that of Section 2.2. In that section we measure the change in wages as the difference in the logarithm of the initial wage after an unemployment spell and the last wage before a job separation. Here we show statistics when the change is measured by the difference in the logarithm of the average wage across subsequent employment spells. Figures 3 and 4 show the unconditional distributions of the change in wages and Tables B.1 
